Posts Tagged ‘Jackson Mississippi Lawyer’

Mississippi Court of Appeals Update – June 7, 2011

Wednesday, June 8th, 2011

Kumar individually and d/b/a Holiday Inn of Columbus, Savage and Savage v. Loper, No. 2009-CA-02037-COA

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging sexual harassment in the workplace and received a default judgment. In reversing the default judgment for Plaintiff, Court found that where Plaintiff receives a letter from defense counsel notifying him of intent to defend claims, prior to the filing of a complaint, the defendants are entitled to three days notice of the hearing on default judgment even where no contact was had with defense counsel after filing of the complaint except for defense counsel notifying Plaintiff that he would not be representing defendants.

Court relied on comment to Rule 55: “The purpose of [the notice requirement] of Rule 55(b) is…to protect those parties who, although delaying in a formal sense by failing to file pleadings within the thirty day period, have otherwise indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to defense the suit.”

The letter from the defendants notifying plaintiffs of an intent to defend claims was enough to entitle defendants to notice of the hearing of the default judgment.

Yarbrough v. Patrick, No. 2010-CA-000391-COA

A suit where a mother alleged daughter had obtained title to assets by abuse of a confidential relationship. Court of Appeals affirmed chancery court’s judgment in favor of daughter. A confidential relationship is like a fiduciary relationship and it “arises when a dominant, overmastering influence controls over a dependent person or trust justifiably reposed.”

Court found that the confidential relationship must exist at the time gifts are made. In this case, the evidence showed the gifts were made several years prior to when mother alleged the confidential relationship existed.

Court also found that the clean hands doctrine prevented mother from asserting rights to assets against daughter where mother testified she gave the assets to her daughter to conceal the assets from a governmental agency (Medicaid) in order to obtain benefits to which was was not legally entitled.

Crosthwait v. Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc. D/B/A Trace Regional Hospital and Marcia Morgan, No. 2010-CA-00526-COA

Plaintiff fell and broke her hip while being assisted from the shower to her bed. She sued the hospital and the nurse who was assisting her. Plaintiff couched her claim as one for ordinary negligence rather than malpractice and defendant sought summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to offer presuit notice, consult an expert prior to filing suit and failed to support her claim with expert testimony. Chickasaw County Circuit Court granted summary judgment.

Despite Plaintiff’s claims to contrary, the Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff’s claim arose in the course of professional medical services. The selection of a proper stool in the shower and whether the floor needed to be dry are questions giving rise to malpractice and expert testimony is required. Summary judgment was affirmed.

Osborne v. Neblett, Real Estate Investor/Developer and Williams, Attorney and Trustee for G. Rives Neblett, No. 2009-CP-01312-COA

Section 89-1-55 requires three weeks between first publication and the foreclosure sale. Failure to comply with the statute’s publication requirements renders the foreclosure sale void. Court of Appeals found foreclosure to be void where sale took place just sixteen days after first publication.

Tennessee Properties, Inc. v. Larry Gillentine, No. 2010-CA-00376-COA

The three-year statute of limitations applies to actions for wrongful or fraudulent foreclosures. S. Land & Res. Co. v. Dobbs, 467, So.2d 652 (Miss. 1985). Because the substitute trustee’s deed was not included in the record, the Court of Appeals would not rule on whether the sale did not comply with the terms of the deed of trust. Aware of the omission in the record, TPI filed a motion to modify the record to include the substituted trustee’s deed, but failed to submit a copy of the deed to the clerk of the chancery court for certification as required by Rule 10(e) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the motion was dismissed.

Also, the doctrine of concealed fraud does not apply to matters of public record. Where an alleged fraudulent conveyance of real property is recorded and available to the public, there can be no concealed fraud preventing the running of the statute of limitations.

Finally, even though a case may be weak or light-headed that is not sufficient to label it frivolous pursuant to Rule 11(b).

- Jake Adams

Nursing Home Must Be Licensed for Notice Protection

Tuesday, June 7th, 2011

In a case where a patient suffered from sepsis, pneumonia, dehydration, and severe bed sores, Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against Yvonne Jenkins and her nursing home, Extra Care. The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to comply with the 60-day notice requirement of 15-1-36 and for failure to comply with 11-1-58, which requires a plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit to file a certificate of consultation stating her attorney consulted at least one qualified expert.

The Supreme Court held that the 60-day notice protection provided by Section 15-1-36 applies only to those health care providers that have been licensed to provide medical services.  Saul v. Jenkins, 963 So.2d 552 (Miss. 2007).

- Jake Adams

Hinds County Jury Returns $750,000.00 Verdict in Nursing Home Wrongful Death Case

Tuesday, June 7th, 2011

I am proud to report that myself  along with Eric Stracener and Andrew Neely represented the Plaintiff in this Wrongful Death Nursing Home case featured on the Mississippi Litigation Review Blog. To read more click here.

- Jake Adams

Mississippi Supreme Court Update – May 19, 2011

Monday, June 6th, 2011

Copiah County School District and Kenneth Funches v. Charles Buckner, No. 2010-IA-000343-SCT

In a personal injury case against Copiah County School District and Kenneth Funches, the Plaintiff failed to served process on either defendant within the 120-day period provided by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h) and the statute of limitations ran prior to Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to effect service. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendants’ motion to set aside the order granting an extension of time. The Supreme Court found no good cause where Plaintiff’s lawyer relied on the assertion of his process server that the defendants had been served, and where the statute of limitations had expired; the trial court had set a date for a status hearing; Plaintiff filed an application for entry of default; and opposing counsel, upon discovery of the lawsuit, had notified plaintiff that their clients had never been served before Plaintiff’s attorney checked for a return of service.

Plaintiff must show good cause for a failure to serve process in a timely manner. Simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance of the rules does not suffice. To show “good cause” the plaintiff must demonstrate that a diligent effort was made to effect timely service.  Placing blame on a process server is insufficient to show good cause.

The Court further elaborated on the effect of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s application to the statute of limitations. Once the notice of claim required by Section 11-46-11 is properly filed, the 365-day statute of limitations application to MTCA cases may be tolled for either 95 days or 120 days. After the tolling period expires, the plaintiff receives an additional ninety (90) days to file any action. If the governmental entity denies the claim, the 95- or 120-day tolling period ends immediately and the additional 90 days is added to the remaining time left in the original one year period not used at the time notice was received.  However, the plaintiff does not get the full benefit of the 95- or 120-day tolling period if the governmental entity denies the claim prior to the expiration of the tolling period.

- Jake Adams

Mississippi Court of Appeals Update May 31, 2011

Friday, June 3rd, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF WILLIAM SMITH AND WIFE SARAH SMITH FOR THE ADOPTION OF JASON WELLS, A MINOR CHILD: TARA WELLS v. WILLIAM SMITH AND SARAH SMITH, No. 2009-CA-01955-COA

In a grandparent adoption or custody case, the doctrine of in loco parentis may not be used to overcome the natural-parent presumption.  However, where the natural parent completely avoids both his or her moral and legal duties and obligations for more than two years and shows complete disregard for the welfare of the child, desertion may be found, thus relinquishing the parent’s right to the natural-parent presumption.

EDWARD M. O’KEEFFE V. BILOXI CASINO CORP. D/BA/ CASINO MAGIC BILOXI, No. 2009-CA-01185-COA

A continuance does not create an opportunity to designate an expert where the sixty days prior to trial has expired pursuant to Rule 4.04(A) Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court.

Also, where an expert has been excluded by court order, another testifying expert may not rely upon the opinion of the excluded expert as a way of circumventing the order excluding that expert’s opinion, despite Rule 7.03 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence’s allowance for the expert to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence.

And a business owner owes an invitee a duty to maintain its hotel in a reasonably safe condition. However, the invitee is still required to use, in the interest of his own safety, that degree of care and prudence which a person of ordinary intelligence would exercise under similar circumstance. Thus a jury instruction may properly require a slip and fall Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care.

- Jake Adams

Supreme Court Update May 26, 2011

Friday, June 3rd, 2011

Jocelyn Howard and Citi Trends, Inc. v. Lyshell Wilson. No. 2010-IA-01181-SCT.

Alleging negligence simply to circumvent the one-year statute of limitations of assault and battery will result in a dismissal. There is no such thing as a negligent battery.

In ruling that there is no such thing as a negligent battery, the Court further stated: “there can be no escape from the bar of the statute of limitations applicable to intentional torts by the mere refusal to style the cause brought in a recognized statutory category…

Daniel P. Dare, M.D. v. Sharon S. Stokes and Paul H. Stokes, No. 2010-CA-00023-SCT

Third parties may not intervene in divorce cases.  Except in the most unusual circumstances third parties are prohibited from intervening in divorce proceedings in the absence of a statute permitting such intervention.” The lone exception to the rule is when the second wife of a recently divorced man sought to intervene when the first wife sued to set aside the divorce. See Cohen v. Cohen, 748 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1999), and it remains the lone exception.

-Jake Adams

Estate Planning – For What?

Thursday, August 5th, 2010

Estate planners and probate lawyers are anxiously awaiting Congress’s next move with regard to the estate tax. As many folks know, there is no estate tax in 2010. Heirs to billion dollar fortunes are making out like bandits if their benefactor dies in 2010 – kind of weird thing to read, isn’t it? But it’s true. Famous New York Yankees owner and billionaire George Steinbrenner died this year, and there have been others. One thought that’s been bandied about is that Congress could make the new estate tax retroactive to 2010. If this doesn’t put a rush on a probate I don’t know what will. Here’s a good update on the estate tax, where it stands now, and where it could go. Keep your local estate planner’s number handy. You may need it soon.

Revocation of Prior Wills

Wednesday, March 24th, 2010

It’s not uncommon to execute more than one will in your lifetime. In fact, estate planners recommend you have your will and estate plan reviewed on a periodic basis in order to ensure your estate will be distributed effectively and in a way that makes sense. After all, circumstances change. When a new will is executed, prior wills are revoked. Even though this is true, it is good practice to destroy prior wills to avoid possible confusion later.

In the Matter of Woodfield, 968 So.2d 421 (Miss. 2007), the Mississippi Supreme Court considered whether the withdrawal of a probated will containing such a revocation clause revived an earlier will. In this case, the executor initially sought to probate a will created by the testator in 2001. When a contest arose, the executor withdrew the 2001 will and sought to probate a will that had been signed by the testator in 1973. Importantly, the 2001 will had a clause revoking all prior wills. The executor argued that the withdrawal of the 2001 will revived the 1973 will. The Mississippi Supreme Court said that if the 2001 will was properly attested and executed, the 1973 will was revoked upon execution of 2001 will. Additionally, the Court cited case law from as far back as 1855, which stated, “a will duly executed according to the statutes, though prevented from taking effect in consequence of some matter dehors the will, as the incapacity of the person to whom the disposition is made to take, is a revocation of a former will.” Crosby v. Alton Ochsnew Medical Foundation, 276 So.2d 661, 669 (Miss. 1973) quoting Vining v. Hall, 40 Miss. 83, 107 (1866). See also Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276 (1855).

Estate Tax: Will They or Won’t They?

Wednesday, December 16th, 2009

Estate planners across the country are keeping an eye on Capitol Hill, where Congress is debating the future of the estate tax. The current estate tax exempts the first $3.5 million of assets from estate tax liability. In 2010 the estate tax will disappear completely, but if no action is taken the tax returns with a vengeance in 2011 at the much lower exemption rate of $1 million.

The current bet is that the 2009 rate with be extended at least for a year. Many in Congress would like to see the 2009 rate of $3.5 million per individual or $7 million per couple made permanent. A vocal group of Republicans would like to see the estate tax permanently repealed, but given their current minority status, that is unlikely. Here’s the latest from Bloomberg.com.

Th estate tax situation is obviously still developing, so stay tuned.

Probating a Lost Foreign Will

Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

The Mississippi Court of Appeals recently found that Section 91-7-33 Miss. Code Ann. does not bar the initial proving of a lost foreign will in Mississippi where the will disposes of property in Mississippi. See In the Matter of the Estate of Artis High, Deceased: Arbella High Watt v. Gracie Cobb, Joe High and David High No. 2008-CA-00799-COA.

The Court of Appeals reversed a Chancery Court decision which held that where the testator was domiciled in another state, and the will was a lost will, the will could not be probated in Mississippi until it was first probated in the state of domicile.

The Court of Appeals emphasized that part of Section 91-7-33 which provides that the original “may be proven,” and aptly pointed out that the statute does not include mandatory language such as the word “must.”