Posts Tagged ‘Jackson Mississippi Attorney’

Mississippi Supreme Court Update – June 16, 2011

Monday, June 20th, 2011

In the Matter of the Estate of Anthony Walter Smith: W.E. Davis, Administrator v. Raymond Smith, No. 2009-CA-01838-SCT

In a Desoto County estate matter, the Supreme Court ruled that the estate was not entitled to prejudgment interest for the beneficiary’s share of estate taxes due where there existed a legitimate disagreement or dispute among the parties’ regarding each one’s tax liability and where the Estate had previously over estimated the amount due from the beneficiaries and where no bad faith was shown and the damages were unliquidated.

The Supreme Court also upheld a judgment against the estate for 24-months back rent where the administrator locked the beneficiary out of two farm buildings in which he owned a life estate for two years following a judgment reforming of title in which the Court determined the beneficiary had a life estate in the property.

The administrator’s obligation to protect the estate property expired when it was determined that the beneficiary had a life estate in the property. The administrator then had a new obligation to relinquish the property to the beneficiary.

Dooley et al. v. Byrd and Independent Roofing Systems, Inc., No. 2009-CA-01830

A Rankin County Circuit Court wrongful death case brought by beneficiaries of Jonathan Wayne Dooley, a two-year-old child who died when the vehicle his mother was driving  struck the rear end of a flatbed trailer that was hanging out of a driveway onto Highway 468. The jury’s verdict was for the defendants. Family conflict existed between the heirs and several heirs were represented at trial by separate attorneys.

The Supreme Court held that all wrongful-death claims must be litigated in one suit and upheld the trial court’s granting of a beneficiary’s joinder motion, stating that Miss. Code Ann. 11-7-13 also mandated that outcome.

Each wrongful-death beneficiary has a right to participate fully in all aspect of a trial. Joining Plaintiff had a right to question all witnesses (trial court had limited questioning to the first Plaintiff to file). Trial court committed reversible error in denying joining Plaintiff’s right to question all the witnesses.

Court also gave a lengthy analysis of jury instructions with regard to warning devices for trucks and buses as contemplated by Section 63-7-71 after upholding the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s jury instruction that misstated the law.

The Court did find error in granting jury instructions that removed fact issues from the jury’s consideration.

Rebuild America, Inc. v. Tim A. Norris, No. 2009-CT-01191-SCT

A Hinds County Chancery Court case setting aside a tax sale for failure to effect personal service pursuant to Section 27-43-3, which requires notice of the tax sale in three forms, personal service by summons, mail at his usual address, and by publication in a newspaper in county which land is located. All three requirements must be met. Under some circumstances where the clerk and sheriff have complied with their duties the tax sale may be confirmed even though the owner never received actual notice of the tax sale, however the sheriff has not complied with his duties in this case when he did not effect personal service despite knowing the owner’s home address.

Mississippi Supreme Court Update – June 9, 2011

Thursday, June 9th, 2011

Kimball Glassco Residential Center, Inc., and Vera Richardson v. Terrance Shanks as Next of Kin of Lois Shanks, No. 2009-IA-01617-SCT

In a personal injury action involving an injury resulting from an automobile accident, defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), 11-46-11(3). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss holding that the defendants waived their statute-of-limitations defense by failing to timely raise and pursue the defense for eleven months while actively participating in the litigation. Trial court further held that the defendants were estopped from asserting the MCTA’s one-year statute of limitations bases on a misrepresentation by the Mississippi Tort Claim’s Board (MTCB) that Delta Community Mental Health Service (DCMHS) was not a state entity.

The Supreme Court reversed on both rulings.

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss eleven months prior to setting a hearing on the motion and little transpired other than service of discovery requests from each party to the other. Nothing occurred of record in the case. The case was dormant until the Defendants answered discovery requests as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure and then set their motion to dismiss for hearing. The Court ruled this is not waiver of the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations.

The Supreme Court ruled that a letter from MTCB to Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledging receipt of a notice of claim and stating that the MTCB had been advised by the Mississippi Department of Health that DCMHS was not a state agency or a department or division of the Mississippi Department of Health was not inequitable conduct on the part of the defendants. Because the misrepresentation of the MTCB was a result of information provided by the Mississippi Department of Health and not the two defendants in this case, the Supreme Court found that the defendants were not equitably estopped from asserting the affirmative defense of the MTCA’s statute of limitations.

Motion to remand for determination of unsound mind to invoke Section 11-46-11(4) of Lois was not well taken where the issue was not raised at the trial level and where Shanks brought the action on behalf of Lois, meaning Lois was not the Plaintiff in the case.

Barry Gregg v. Natchez Trace Electric Power Association and Electric Power Associations of Mississippie Workers’ Compensation Group, Inc., No. 2009-CT-00699-SCT

Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in considering Plaintiff’s higher wages post-injury as determinative of no lost wage-earning capacity where Plaintiff had shown that he could no longer take after-hours call (climbing power poles) whereas he regularly took call prior to his injury.

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Talmadge Littlejohn, No. 2010-JP-01954-SCT

Holding an attorney in criminal contempt for not reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in open court infringed on the attorney’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech and such was a violation of Canons 1, 3B(2), 3B(8), 2A and 3B(4).

- Jake Adams

Mississippi Court of Appeals Update – June 7, 2011

Wednesday, June 8th, 2011

Kumar individually and d/b/a Holiday Inn of Columbus, Savage and Savage v. Loper, No. 2009-CA-02037-COA

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging sexual harassment in the workplace and received a default judgment. In reversing the default judgment for Plaintiff, Court found that where Plaintiff receives a letter from defense counsel notifying him of intent to defend claims, prior to the filing of a complaint, the defendants are entitled to three days notice of the hearing on default judgment even where no contact was had with defense counsel after filing of the complaint except for defense counsel notifying Plaintiff that he would not be representing defendants.

Court relied on comment to Rule 55: “The purpose of [the notice requirement] of Rule 55(b) is…to protect those parties who, although delaying in a formal sense by failing to file pleadings within the thirty day period, have otherwise indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to defense the suit.”

The letter from the defendants notifying plaintiffs of an intent to defend claims was enough to entitle defendants to notice of the hearing of the default judgment.

Yarbrough v. Patrick, No. 2010-CA-000391-COA

A suit where a mother alleged daughter had obtained title to assets by abuse of a confidential relationship. Court of Appeals affirmed chancery court’s judgment in favor of daughter. A confidential relationship is like a fiduciary relationship and it “arises when a dominant, overmastering influence controls over a dependent person or trust justifiably reposed.”

Court found that the confidential relationship must exist at the time gifts are made. In this case, the evidence showed the gifts were made several years prior to when mother alleged the confidential relationship existed.

Court also found that the clean hands doctrine prevented mother from asserting rights to assets against daughter where mother testified she gave the assets to her daughter to conceal the assets from a governmental agency (Medicaid) in order to obtain benefits to which was was not legally entitled.

Crosthwait v. Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc. D/B/A Trace Regional Hospital and Marcia Morgan, No. 2010-CA-00526-COA

Plaintiff fell and broke her hip while being assisted from the shower to her bed. She sued the hospital and the nurse who was assisting her. Plaintiff couched her claim as one for ordinary negligence rather than malpractice and defendant sought summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to offer presuit notice, consult an expert prior to filing suit and failed to support her claim with expert testimony. Chickasaw County Circuit Court granted summary judgment.

Despite Plaintiff’s claims to contrary, the Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff’s claim arose in the course of professional medical services. The selection of a proper stool in the shower and whether the floor needed to be dry are questions giving rise to malpractice and expert testimony is required. Summary judgment was affirmed.

Osborne v. Neblett, Real Estate Investor/Developer and Williams, Attorney and Trustee for G. Rives Neblett, No. 2009-CP-01312-COA

Section 89-1-55 requires three weeks between first publication and the foreclosure sale. Failure to comply with the statute’s publication requirements renders the foreclosure sale void. Court of Appeals found foreclosure to be void where sale took place just sixteen days after first publication.

Tennessee Properties, Inc. v. Larry Gillentine, No. 2010-CA-00376-COA

The three-year statute of limitations applies to actions for wrongful or fraudulent foreclosures. S. Land & Res. Co. v. Dobbs, 467, So.2d 652 (Miss. 1985). Because the substitute trustee’s deed was not included in the record, the Court of Appeals would not rule on whether the sale did not comply with the terms of the deed of trust. Aware of the omission in the record, TPI filed a motion to modify the record to include the substituted trustee’s deed, but failed to submit a copy of the deed to the clerk of the chancery court for certification as required by Rule 10(e) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the motion was dismissed.

Also, the doctrine of concealed fraud does not apply to matters of public record. Where an alleged fraudulent conveyance of real property is recorded and available to the public, there can be no concealed fraud preventing the running of the statute of limitations.

Finally, even though a case may be weak or light-headed that is not sufficient to label it frivolous pursuant to Rule 11(b).

- Jake Adams

Nursing Home Must Be Licensed for Notice Protection

Tuesday, June 7th, 2011

In a case where a patient suffered from sepsis, pneumonia, dehydration, and severe bed sores, Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against Yvonne Jenkins and her nursing home, Extra Care. The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to comply with the 60-day notice requirement of 15-1-36 and for failure to comply with 11-1-58, which requires a plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit to file a certificate of consultation stating her attorney consulted at least one qualified expert.

The Supreme Court held that the 60-day notice protection provided by Section 15-1-36 applies only to those health care providers that have been licensed to provide medical services.  Saul v. Jenkins, 963 So.2d 552 (Miss. 2007).

- Jake Adams

Hinds County Jury Returns $750,000.00 Verdict in Nursing Home Wrongful Death Case

Tuesday, June 7th, 2011

I am proud to report that myself  along with Eric Stracener and Andrew Neely represented the Plaintiff in this Wrongful Death Nursing Home case featured on the Mississippi Litigation Review Blog. To read more click here.

- Jake Adams

Mississippi Supreme Court Update – May 19, 2011

Monday, June 6th, 2011

Copiah County School District and Kenneth Funches v. Charles Buckner, No. 2010-IA-000343-SCT

In a personal injury case against Copiah County School District and Kenneth Funches, the Plaintiff failed to served process on either defendant within the 120-day period provided by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h) and the statute of limitations ran prior to Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to effect service. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendants’ motion to set aside the order granting an extension of time. The Supreme Court found no good cause where Plaintiff’s lawyer relied on the assertion of his process server that the defendants had been served, and where the statute of limitations had expired; the trial court had set a date for a status hearing; Plaintiff filed an application for entry of default; and opposing counsel, upon discovery of the lawsuit, had notified plaintiff that their clients had never been served before Plaintiff’s attorney checked for a return of service.

Plaintiff must show good cause for a failure to serve process in a timely manner. Simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance of the rules does not suffice. To show “good cause” the plaintiff must demonstrate that a diligent effort was made to effect timely service.  Placing blame on a process server is insufficient to show good cause.

The Court further elaborated on the effect of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s application to the statute of limitations. Once the notice of claim required by Section 11-46-11 is properly filed, the 365-day statute of limitations application to MTCA cases may be tolled for either 95 days or 120 days. After the tolling period expires, the plaintiff receives an additional ninety (90) days to file any action. If the governmental entity denies the claim, the 95- or 120-day tolling period ends immediately and the additional 90 days is added to the remaining time left in the original one year period not used at the time notice was received.  However, the plaintiff does not get the full benefit of the 95- or 120-day tolling period if the governmental entity denies the claim prior to the expiration of the tolling period.

- Jake Adams

Mississippi Court of Appeals Update May 31, 2011

Friday, June 3rd, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF WILLIAM SMITH AND WIFE SARAH SMITH FOR THE ADOPTION OF JASON WELLS, A MINOR CHILD: TARA WELLS v. WILLIAM SMITH AND SARAH SMITH, No. 2009-CA-01955-COA

In a grandparent adoption or custody case, the doctrine of in loco parentis may not be used to overcome the natural-parent presumption.  However, where the natural parent completely avoids both his or her moral and legal duties and obligations for more than two years and shows complete disregard for the welfare of the child, desertion may be found, thus relinquishing the parent’s right to the natural-parent presumption.

EDWARD M. O’KEEFFE V. BILOXI CASINO CORP. D/BA/ CASINO MAGIC BILOXI, No. 2009-CA-01185-COA

A continuance does not create an opportunity to designate an expert where the sixty days prior to trial has expired pursuant to Rule 4.04(A) Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court.

Also, where an expert has been excluded by court order, another testifying expert may not rely upon the opinion of the excluded expert as a way of circumventing the order excluding that expert’s opinion, despite Rule 7.03 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence’s allowance for the expert to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence.

And a business owner owes an invitee a duty to maintain its hotel in a reasonably safe condition. However, the invitee is still required to use, in the interest of his own safety, that degree of care and prudence which a person of ordinary intelligence would exercise under similar circumstance. Thus a jury instruction may properly require a slip and fall Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care.

- Jake Adams

Supreme Court Update May 26, 2011

Friday, June 3rd, 2011

Jocelyn Howard and Citi Trends, Inc. v. Lyshell Wilson. No. 2010-IA-01181-SCT.

Alleging negligence simply to circumvent the one-year statute of limitations of assault and battery will result in a dismissal. There is no such thing as a negligent battery.

In ruling that there is no such thing as a negligent battery, the Court further stated: “there can be no escape from the bar of the statute of limitations applicable to intentional torts by the mere refusal to style the cause brought in a recognized statutory category…

Daniel P. Dare, M.D. v. Sharon S. Stokes and Paul H. Stokes, No. 2010-CA-00023-SCT

Third parties may not intervene in divorce cases.  Except in the most unusual circumstances third parties are prohibited from intervening in divorce proceedings in the absence of a statute permitting such intervention.” The lone exception to the rule is when the second wife of a recently divorced man sought to intervene when the first wife sued to set aside the divorce. See Cohen v. Cohen, 748 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1999), and it remains the lone exception.

-Jake Adams

Prenuptial Agreements – An Important Estate Planning Tool

Thursday, July 8th, 2010

One of the estate planner’s most important planning tools is a prenuptial agreement. Prenuptial agreements are especially important for those who are entering into second marriages with children from a first marriage, or where one of the parties has a substantial estate prior to the marriage. Prenuptial agreements are often used in second marriages for the purpose of ensuring that the estate is preserved for children and others. Statistics show that second marriages have a high rate of divorce, so the use of an effective prenuptial agreement lessens the risks involved in entering into another committed relationship. Prenuptial agreements are also a valuable tool for ensuring family businesses stay in the family.

Important Tips for an effective prenuptial agreement:

1. For reasons that should be obvious, don’t wait until the day before the wedding to discuss the prenuptial agreement.
2.  Discuss the prenuptial agreement with each other openly.
3.  Discuss all of your assets with each other, as full disclosure is necessary for a valid prenuptial agreement.

Many people do not get prenuptial agreements because they believe it only increases the likelihood the marriage will fail, however, this is a cynical view of marriage. After all, marriage shouldn’t be about assets.  For most of us, marriage is about love and commitment. If the only tie that binds is the thought of splitting assets, that’s not a commitment. Oftentimes, a prenuptial agreement is the only truly responsible way to enter into marriage.

Executors: Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Friday, May 7th, 2010

Executors owe a fiduciary duty to the estate they are administering. The Mississippi Supreme Court defines the obligations and duties of an executor to (1) reduce to possession the personal assets of the testator; (2) to pay the testator’s debts; (3) to pay legacies; and (4) to distribute the surplus to the parties entitled thereto.  See Yeates v. Box, 198 Miss. 602, 22 So.2d 411 (1945).

Mississippi law clearly provides that when an executor violates his or her fiduciary duty to the estate, that executor should be removed. Likewise, where an executor has a conflict of interest with the estate, that executor should resign be removed.

“An executor may not take inconsistent positions which would be detrimental to the heirs on the one hand and beneficial to himself on the other. When an executor finds his own interest in conflict with those of the estate, the sanctity of the fiduciary relationship is invaded and he should immediately resign as executor.” See In the Matter of Chambers, 458 So.2d 691 (Miss. 1984), citing Ratliff v. Ratliff, 395 So.2d 956 (Miss. 1981).